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Abstract 
 
The objective of the study is to examine the association between internal and external audit attributes, audit committee 
characteristics, ownership concentration and discretionary accruals (as a proxy of earnings quality) based on the agency and 
resource dependence theories. The final sample of the study is 508 firms listed on the Malaysia Main Market from 2009 to 
2012. Two measures of discretionary accruals are used, Modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995); and extended 
Modified Jones Model by Yoon et al. (2006). Results of the study suggest that outsourcing internal audit function, investment in 
internal audit function and external audit fees are related to higher earnings quality. However, large audit committee size, more 
frequent audit committee meetings, having a senior or former audit partner as audit committee chairman and ownership 
concentration are associated with lower earnings quality. This study extends the prior related literature by apply extended 
modified Jones model by Yoon, et al.’s (2006) of discretionary accruals to measure earnings quality in Malaysia Main Market 
listed companies and introduce new variables, namely audit committee chairman who is a senior or former audit partner in the 
audit firm.  
 
Keywords: Audit committee, audit fees, internal audit function, ownership concentration, discretionary accruals, earnings quality, 
Malaysia. 
 
 
 Introduction 1.
 
 With the recent high-profile scandals in accounting, investors have become concerned with earnings management and 
have begun to demand for earnings quality for the purpose of enhancing financial statement quality (Bedard & Johnstone, 
2004). Certain aspects, such as discretionary accruals, have received much attention as an important indicator of 
earnings quality. High earnings quality, financial reporting transparency and auditing are important to gain investors’ and 
other stakeholders’ confidence. 
Earnings management is reflected in earnings quality, whereby greater earnings management results in lower 
earnings quality and vice versa. Management engages in earnings management for many reasons, among them being to 
reduce political costs (Warfield, Wild & Wild, 1995), to avoid default in debt covenant (Klein, 2002; Davidson, Goodwin-
Stewart & Kent, 2005) and to increase manager’s wealth (Radzi, Islam& Ibrahim, 2011). 
The purpose of the study is to examine the influence of internal and external audit as governance monitoring 
mechanisms because they are responsible for evaluating the quality of financial reporting. The audit committee is 
considered as one of the pillars of accountability because it supports the boards’ role to monitor the process of financial 
reporting while the function of internal and external audit supports the function of the audit committee through auditors’ 
reports. Simunic (1984) argues that the provision of external non-audit services leads to high audit quality. Thus, 
companies that engage external auditors to carry out non-audit services will have less accounting risks than companies 
that do not engage such services.  
This study extends the prior related literature by several ways. First, this study is the first study to apply Yoon, 
Miller and Jiraporn’s (2006) model of discretionary accruals to measure earnings quality of companies listed on the 
Malaysian Main Market. Second, we introduce new variables, namely audit committee chairman who is a senior or former 
audit partner in the audit firm. Third, following the previous studies (Porta, LopezǦDeǦSilanes & Shleifer, 1999; Fan & 
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Wong, 2002; Yunos, Smith & Ismail, 2010; Kamardin & Haron, 2011; Abdullah & Nasir (2004); Abdul Rahman & Ali 2006) 
suggestions of the effect of ownership concentration on monitoring mechanisms, information asymmetry and its impact 
on earnings quality, we also examine ownership concentration (five largest shareholders) on earnings quality of 
companies listed on the Malaysian Main Market. 
 
 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 2.
 
The Malaysian government took certain measures as proposed by the regulatory bodies and accountancy professions to 
alleviate the occurrence of fraud and fraudulent financial reporting. This resulted in the implementation of the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance in March 2000. This code covers four areas, i.e., board of directors, accountability, 
shareholders and remuneration of directors. The revision of the Code was done in 2007 (known as the MCCG 2007), to 
allow for greater internal monitoring control. The function of an internal auditor, who directly reports to the audit 
committee, is to recognise and manage risks (Hassan, Moyes, Mohd-Sanusi & Iskandar, 2010). In addition, the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (revised again in 2012 and known as MCCG 2012) pays greater attention to 
the composition and structure of the board, where the directors’ role is recognized as active and responsible fiduciaries. 
Directors should ensure that the governance structure is effective in order to enable risk and internal control 
management. 
 
2.1 Audit Committee Size 
 
According to the resource dependence theory, a larger audit committee means the members can bring more resources to 
the firm, such as experience and expertise, which contribute to the audit committee’s effectiveness in monitoring 
management, hence leading to high earnings quality. The Cadbury Report (1992) and the Smith Report (2003) stipulate 
the number of audit committee members must be at least three; the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) also mandates a 
minimum of three members in the audit committee. Buchalter and Yokomoto (2003) recommend that audit committees 
should be composed of three to five members although it is generally based on the firm’s size. The Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance recommends there should be at least three non-executive directors in the audit committee, a 
majority of whom should be independent. 
Empirical studies provide evidence that audit committee size is related to high earnings quality (Garcia, Barbadillo 
& Perez, 2010; Lin, Li & Yang, 2006). Additional evidence from Malaysia by Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010); and 
Ismail, Adibah, Dunstan and Zijl (2009) find a significantly positive relationship between audit committee size and 
earnings quality. However, Abbott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan (2003); Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004); Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt (2003); Baxter and Cotter (2009); and Adiguzel (2013) find an insignificant association between 
audit committee size and earnings quality. 
Following the resource dependence theory, it is predicted that the appointment of many audit committee members 
contributes to efficient internal monitoring and better earnings quality. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: Audit committee size is negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
 
2.2 Audit Committee Independence 
 
From the agency theory perspective, the effectiveness of audit committee is based on its characteristics (Ika & Ghazali, 
2012; Klein, 2002; Garcia, Barbadillo & Perez, 2012; Vafeas, 2005). For the audit committee to achieve its functions, 
itsmembers should be independent from the management (Ismail et al., 2009; Krishnamoorthy, 2002). Lin, Li and Yang 
(2006) argue that an audit committee with majority of independent members can effectively monitor the management and 
reduce the opportunity for fraudulent reporting because there is less interference from the management. 
Mustafa and Yusof (2010) argue that the independence of directors results in high financial reporting quality. 
Several empirical studies have shed light on the effectiveness of audit committee independence. Klein (2002) shows that 
audit committee independence is related to decreased abnormal accruals (proxy of earnings quality). Yang and Krishnan 
(2005); and Yunos (2011) find that audit committee independence is related to less discretionary accruals. Audit 
committee independence is also related to higher earnings quality (Bradbury, Mak & Tan, 2006; Garcia et al., 2012) and 
quality financial reporting (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Bedard & Johnstone, 2004; Klein, 2002; Siagian & Tresnaningsih, 
2011). Some studies report an insignificant association between audit committee independence and earnings 
informativeness (Petra, 2007); discretionary accruals (Xie et al., 2003; Garcia et al., 2010; Adiguzel, 2013); and accrual 
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quality (Baxter & Cotter, 2009). 
In relation to Malaysian studies, Saleh, Iskandar & Rahmat (2007); and Mansor, Ch-Ahmad, Ahmad-Zaluki and 
Osman (2013) report a negative relationship between audit committee independence and earnings management; while 
Ahmad Zaluki and Wan Hussin (2010) show a positive association. On the other hand, some studies find no significant 
association between the independence of audit committee and earnings quality (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Abdullah & 
Nasir, 2004; Ismail et al., 2009). Based on the agency theory, we predict that an independent audit committee will be able 
to monitor management behaviour to manage earnings. Thus we hypothesize that:  
 
H2: Audit committee independence is negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
 
2.3 Audit Committee Meeting 
 
Bursa Malaysia emphasizes that the audit committee should meet at least four times annually. The frequency of audit 
committee meetings is a reflection of its effectiveness; the directors’ experience and expertise can enhance internal 
monitoring functions (Zaman, Hudaib & Haniffa, 2011). In relation to earnings quality, Garcia et al. (2010) find evidence 
that frequency of audit committee meetings is related to high earnings quality. Xie et al. (2003); and Garcia, et al. (2010) 
find frequency of audit committee meetings decreases the level of discretionary accruals. Saleh et al. (2007); and Yusof 
(2010) reveal a negative association between earnings management and meeting frequency of audit committees in 
Malaysia. Another study in the U.S. by Goh (2009) reveals that audit committee meeting frequency relates positively to 
timelier remediation of material weaknesses. However, some studies find no relationship between frequency of audit 
committee meetings and earnings quality (Baxter & Cotter, 2009; Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Mohamad, Rashid & 
Shawtari, 2012). Thus, we hypothesize that: 
 
H3: The frequent meeting of audit committee is negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
 
2.4 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
 
Financial expertise is very important for audit committee effectiveness to enhance the integrity of financial reporting 
quality. The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance recommends that at least one of the audit committee members 
must have financial expertise. Xie et al. (2003); Baxter and Cotter (2009); and Chen and Zhou (2007) find evidence that 
financial expertise in audit committees decreases discretionary accruals. With regards to Malaysian companies, Saleh et 
al. (2007); and Yusof (2010) find audit committee financial expertise leads to high earnings quality .On the other hand, 
Mohamad et al. (2012) find no relationship between audit committee financial expertise and earnings quality. Based on 
the agency and resource dependence theories, we argue that audit committee financial expertise reduces discretionary 
accruals and enhances earnings quality. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
 
H4: Audit committee financial expertise is negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
 
2.5 Audit Committee’s Chairman Being Former Audit Partner 
 
The resource dependence theory proposes that a firm’s directors who have knowledge and expertise bring important 
resources to the company which lead to increasing the firm’s internal monitoring and enhancing financial reporting quality 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Likewise, a former audit partner in the audit committee can be an expert who can help to 
increase the audit committee’s internal monitoring effectiveness because he or she has experience in auditing, internal 
control and financial statements (Naiker & Sharma, 2009). Naiker and Sharma (2009) examined the relationship between 
former audit partners on the audit committee and internal control deficiencies and find a negative relationship. However, 
another study by Menon and Williams (2004) finds that firms having a former audit partner as officers or directors are 
associated with larger accruals, thus suggesting a potential threat to audit independence. A study in Malaysia by Yusof 
(2010) finds former senior audit managers/partners are associated with larger discretionary accruals. Therefore, the 
chairman position could be the most influence factor. Accordingly, this study aims to provide empirical evidence about 
audit committees' chairman former audit partner which unexplored issue. Thus we hypothesize that:  
 
H5: Audit committee’s chairman being former audit partner is negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
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2.6 Investment in Internal Audit Function 
 
According to the agency theory, an increase in the internal control system could lead to an increase in the monitoring 
process of the company to reinforce and increase the financial information outcomes (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Internal 
audit function has become a crucial internal monitoring mechanism in corporate governance (Al-Shetwi, Ramadili, 
Chowdury & Sori, 2011). Prawitt, Smith and Wood (2009) argue that internal audit function that is relatively well funded 
has a greater monitoring ability to detect and deter material misstatements. Increased resources enable the internal audit 
department to hire and retain more competent personnel. 
The MCCG 2007 supports the roles and responsibilities of the internal audit function. The board should set up an 
internal audit function, which is directly accountable to the audit committee, to recognise and manage risks. Investment in 
the internal audit function implies more competent internal audit function personnel can help management to establish 
stronger controls over financial reporting, thus reducing the existence of control problems (Lin, Pizzini, Vargus & Bardhan, 
2011). Yasin and Nelson (2012) find a positive relationship between external audit quality and cost of internal audit 
function. Further, Prawitt et al. (2009) find a significant association between internal audit function and absolute abnormal 
accruals. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
 
H5: Investment in internal audit function is negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
 
2.7 Sourcing Arrangement of Internal Audit Function  
 
Internal audit function can be undertaken in-house by the internal audit department in the company or outsourced to other 
professional companies. Outsourced internal audit refers to internal audit services that are undertaken by independent 
accounting firms (Carcello, Hermanson & Raghunandan, 2005; Desai, Gerard & Tripathy, 2011). According to Bursa 
Malaysia, listed companies are required to disclose whether their internal audit function is performed in-house or is 
outsourced. Some studies have found the in-house internal audit function leads to greater internal monitoring and control 
over audit operations, thereby protecting proprietary information, providing better understanding of business processes 
and associated risks from outsiders and nonemployees as well as learning opportunities for the company’s own 
employees compared to an outsourced internal audit function (Vecchio & Clinton, 2003; Rittenberg, 1999). The benefits 
of in-house audit function are due to in-depth knowledge, loyalty and role in handling crisis situations, such as those 
involving fraud (Spekle, Elten & Kruis, 2007). 
On the other hand, advocates of outsourced internal audit function argue that in-house internal auditors are less 
independent than outsourced internal auditors as it is difficult for an employee to be truly independent from the 
management (James, 2003; Ahlawat & Lowe, 2004). There are external auditors who consider internal auditors to be 
more objective and independent when the internal auditors are not employees of the company (Gramling & Hermanson, 
2006). Johl, Johl, Subramaniam & Cooper (2013) find the internal audit function increases discretionary accruals when 
this function is outsourced, but the in-house internal audit function decreases the level of discretionary accruals. The 
above discussion leads to the hypothesis that: 
 
H6: Sourcing arrangement of internal audit function is associated with discretionary accruals 
 
2.8 Big4 Audit Firm 
 
Big 4 audit firms are commonly used as proxy of audit quality which is considered as an external monitoring mechanism 
(Fan & Wong, 2005). Davidson et al. (2005) argue that Big4 audit firms affect earnings quality positively with respect to 
earnings management activity detection due to higher expertise and resources that Big4 audit firms have relative to their 
smaller counterparts. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
 
H7: Companies which are audited by Big4 audit firms are negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
 
2.9 Audit Fees 
 
An audit fees, as a proxy of audit quality, is an important external monitoring mechanism to mitigate earnings 
management (high earnings quality). Frank, Johnson and Nelson (2002) find that an audit fees is associated with smaller 
discretionary accruals. Also, Larcker and Richardson (2004) find that strong governance mitigates the negative 
relationship between audit fees and accruals. Gul, Chen &Tsui (2003) find positive relationship between audit fees and 
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discretionary accruals. Antle, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy & Zhou (2006) find audit fees leads to high abnormal accruals. 
Additionally, Hasnan, Rahman & Mahenthiran (2012) show evidence that audit fees is positively related to fraudulent 
financial reporting in Malaysia. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
 
H8: Audit fees for external audit are negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
 
2.10 Non-Audit Services Fees 
 
More investment in non-audit services could increase audit quality by increasing an auditor’s ability to detect earnings 
management (Dechow & Schrand, 2010). Antle et al. (2006) find non-audit services fees decreases the level of abnormal 
accruals. While, Frankel et al. (2002) find that non-audit services fees is associated with higher discretionary accruals. 
Thus, we hypothesizes that: 
 
H9: Non-audit services fees for external audit are negatively associated with discretionary accruals 
 
2.11 Ownership Concentration 
 
Ownership concentration is said to be a source of agency problems because higher ownership concentration provides 
more power to a limited number of shareholders, who in turn might expropriate minority shareholders’ interests (Porta, et 
al., 1999). Fan and Wong (2002) report that ownership concentration is related to low earnings quality. Yunos, et al. 
(2010) find ownership concentration is associated with lower accounting conservatism. Another study by Kamardin and 
Haron (2011) suggests effective monitoring mechanisms through concentrated ownership in Malaysian companies 
whereby there is interest alignment between the majority and minority shareholders. However, Abdullah and Nasir (2004); 
and Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) provide evidence on the possible influence of concentrated ownership on board 
independence in relation to earnings management. Following the agency theory, this study hypothesizes that: 
 
H10: Ownership concentration is positively associated with discretionary accruals 
 
 Research Method 3.
 
The population of the study is 822 firms in year 2012 listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia. The period of study 
covers four years (from 2009 to 2012). The study includes the year 2009 because it is the first year full disclosure for the 
cost of investment in internal audit function is made as required by the Bursa Malaysia. We follow previous studies by 
excluding finance-related companies and unit trusts (Yatim, Kent& Clarkson, 2006; Yunos, et al., 2010); firms with 
incomplete online annual reports for the period between 2009 and 2012; and firms which have missing data of study 
variables. The final sample of the study is 508 firms. Data were collected from Data Stream and annual reports available 
on the Bursa Malaysia website. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample by industries.  
 
Table 1. Sample of Study by Industries 
 
Industries Firms Observations Percentage 
Construction 30 120 6
Consumer 83 332 16
Industrial products 163 652 32
Plantation 33 132 6
Property 49 196 10
Technology 23 92 5
Trading and Services 127 508 25
Total 508 2,032 100
 
3.1 Measurement of Discretionary Accruals 
 
Discretionary accruals are used as proxy for earnings quality. Two measurements of discretionary accruals are used in 
this study to see whether the results are consistent for all the models. The first measurement (DA1) follows the modified 
Jones model by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) which has been widely used in previous studies. Ordinary-Least 
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Squares (OLS) cross-sectional regression for all study years and industries are used to estimate the fitted values 
(coefficients of a1, a2, and a3). The equation to calculate total accruals is as follows:  
ACCt /TAt-1 = a0+a1(1 / TAt-1)+ a2(ǻREV - ǻREC /TAt-1)+ a3 (PPE /T At-1 )+ et (1) 
Where: 
ACCt = total accruals measured by net income – cash flows from operations 
TAt-1 = prior total assets 
ǻREV = change in sales/revenue 
ǻREC = change in trade receivables 
PPE = property, plant and equipment 
et= error term. 
Following Dechow et al. (1995), the change in accounts receivable is deducted from the change in revenues before 
estimation. Then, the industry- and year-specific is used to estimate the parameter estimates (coefficients a0; a1; a2; and 
a3) to infer non-discretionary accruals (NDA) as in equation (2): 
NDAt = a0 + a1 (1 / TAt-1) + a2 (ǻREV - ǻREC /TAt-1) + a3 (PPE /T At-1) (2) 
The difference between estimation (standardized residuals) in equation (2) and actual accruals represents the total 
discretionary accruals in the following equation: 
DAt = ACCt - NDAt        (3) 
Where:  
NDA = non-discretionary accruals 
DA = discretionary accruals from the residual estimated from model 1 
The second measurement of discretionary accruals (DA2) follows the modified Jones model by Yoon et al. (2006). 
Studies in Korea by Yoon et al. (2006); and in Bangladesh by Islam, Ali and Ahmed (2014) find that the modified Jones 
model by Dechow et al. (1995) does not robust for Asian companies. The model (DA2) is described in equation (4): 
TAt/REVt=ȕ0+ ȕ1(ǻREVt– ǻRECt)/ REVt + ȕ2 (ǻ EXPt – ǻPAYt) / REVt + ȕ3(DEPt+ RETt) / REVt + et (4) 
Where: 
ǻEXP = change in sum of cost of goods sold and selling and general administrative expenses excluding non-cash 
expenses. 
ǻPAY = change in accounts payable 
DEP = depreciation expenses 
RET = retirement benefits expenses 
Yoon et al.’s (2006) model proposes that the total accruals are related to changes in the cash revenue/sales, 
change of cash expenses and non-cash expenses of depreciation expenses and the expenses of retirement benefits. 
Discretionary accruals are accruals minus non-discretionary accruals for each observation as follows: 
DAt=TAt/ REVt– [ȕ0+ ȕ1(ǻREVt– ǻRECt)/ REVt + ȕ2 (ǻ EXPt – ǻPAYt) / REVt + ȕ3(DEPt + RETt) / REVt] (5) 
The absolute value of discretionary accruals |DA| represents earnings management because earnings 
management can be income-increasing or income-decreasing accruals. Bedard and Johnstone (2004); Klein (2002); and 
Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) suggest that the absolute value of abnormal accruals is a good proxy for the combined 
effect of income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. Thus, the high absolute value of discretionary 
accruals indicates low earnings quality and vice versa.  
Table 2 shows that the extended model of Yoon et al. (2006) is significant at the 1% level and it has an explanatory 
power of 47.54% which is more than Dechow et al.’s (1995) model of 0.81%. The R2 shows that the model by Yoon et 
al.(2006) has more explanatory power to capture the discretionary accruals of Malaysian Main Market listed companies. 
 
Table 2. Multiple Regression Results of Discretionary Accruals  
 
Variables M-Jones by Dechow et al. (1995) Extended M-Jones by Yoon et al. (2006 ) Coef. t-stat Variables Coef. t-stat 
_cons -0.0110** -2.31 _cons 0.0852 1.57 
1 / TA -485.35 -1.31 (ǻREV– ǻREC)/ REV -0.0924*** -19.91 
(ǻREV – ǻREC) /TA 0.0112 1.06 (ǻ EXP – ǻPAY) / REV 0.1321*** 23.50 
PPE /T A -0.0346*** -3.78 (DEP + RET) / REV -3.8545*** -29.95 
F-value 5.25 613.74 
Sig 0 0 
R-squared 0.0081 0.4754 
N 2032 2032 
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Hence, the model of Yoon et al. (2006) is used as (DA2) the second measurement of discretionary accruals (proxy of 
earnings quality) in this study.  
 
3.2 Discretionary Accruals Model Specification 
 
Specifically, this study attempts to examine the relationship between audit committee characteristics (size, independence, 
frequency of meetings, financial expertise and chairman being former audit partner), internal audit function, Big4 audit 
firm, audit and non-audit services fees, ownership concentration and earnings quality. In addition, following previous 
studies, we include firm size, return on assets, leverage, income loss and sales growth as control variables (Ismail et al., 
2009; Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2005; Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Dechow, Richardson & Tuna, 2003). Additionally, we 
include years and industries as dummy variables to control business cycle effects and differences across industries 
(Datta, Iskandar-Datta & Singh, 2013). The model to achieve the objectives is listed below:  
|DA| = ȕ1ACSIZE + ȕ2ACIND + ȕ3 ACMEET + ȕ4 ACEXPERT + ȕ5ACPART + ȕ6 IAFINVE + ȕ7 IAFSOUR + ȕ8BIG4 
+ ȕ9AF + ȕ10NONAF +ȕ11 OWCO + ȕ12 ROA + ȕ13LEV+ ȕ14FSIZE+ ȕ15LOSS + ȕ16 SGROWTH + e 
Where: 
|DA| = absolute value of discretionary accruals 
ACSIZE = audit committee size 
ACIND = audit committee independence 
ACMEET = audit committee meeting 
ACEXPERT = audit committee financial expertise 
ACPART = audit committees’ chairman former audit partner 
IAFINVE = cost of internal audit function 
IAFSOUR = internal audit function sourcing arrangement 
BIG4 = big 4 audit firm 
AF = external audit fees 
NONAF = external non-audit services fees 
OWCO5 = ownership concentration  
ROA = return on assets 
LEV = leverage 
FSIZE = firm size  
LOSS = net income loss 
SGROWTH = sales growth 
 
Table 3 provides a summary of measurements of variables used in the study. 
 
Table 3. Summary of Measurement of Study Variables  
 
Variables Measurement
ACIND Percentage of total number of independent non-executive directors divided by the total number of AC members (Abdul 
Rahman & Ali, 2006; Mohamad et al., 2012). 
ACSIZE Total number of audit committee members (Saleh et al., 2007).
ACEXPERT The ratio of audit committee members with accounting and financial knowledge to total members of AC (Saleh et al., 2007; 
Goh 2009; Zaman et al., 2011). 
ACPART The chairman of audit committee who was previously a senior auditor in audit firm (senior manager or partner) (Yusof, 2010). 
ACMEET Frequency of audit committee meetings (Saleh et al., 2007; Xie, et al., 2003; Zaman et al., 2011).
IAFINVE The natural log of internal audit cost (Johl, et al., 2013).
IAFSOUR Equals “1”, if IAF is established in-house and “0” otherwise (Johl, et al., 2013).
BIG4 Equals “1” if the firm is audited by Big4 Auditors; and “0” otherwise (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Davidson et al., 2005). 
AF The natural log of external audit fees (Frankel et al., 2002; Antle et al., 2006).
NONAF The natural log of external non-audit services fees (Frankel et al., 2002; Antle et al., 2006).
OWCO Ownership by largest five shareholders (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002).
FSIZE Natural log of total assets (Ismail et al., 2009; Peasnell et al., 2005; Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006).
LEV The ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Klein, 2002; Davidson et al., 2005).
ROA The annual net profit of individual firm before tax divided by total assets (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Ismail et al., 2009). 
LOSS Dummy variable equal to“1” if the net income is less than zero and “0” otherwise (Dechow et al., 2003). 
SGROWTH Sales growth, annual sales growth (current year sales – prior year’s sales)/prior year’s sales (Ahmed, Billings Morton & 
Stanford-Harris, 2002). 
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 Descriptive Statistics and Analysis 4.
 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of the continuous variables while Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of the 
dichotomous variables. Table 4 shows the average size of audit committee of Malaysian Main Market companies is three 
members. A total of 88%of the audit committee members are independent directors. An average (Mean) of 47.47% of the 
audit committee members have financial expertise. There is an increase in audit committee independence and audit 
financial expertise compared to findings in Yunos et al. (2010) of 70% and 37%, respectively, using data from 2001 to 
2007. This increase in audit committee independence follows the recommendation of the MCCG that independent 
directors should dominate the audit committee. Furthermore, the minimum value of 67% for audit committee 
independence indicates that the audit committee is dominated by independent directors.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables 
 
Variable Name Minimum Maximum Mean S.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
DA1 0.002 0.195 0.056 0.050 1.266 4.028 
DA2 0.007 1.452 0.256 0.338 2.258 7.801 
ACSIZE 3.000 5.000 3.237 0.473 1.815 5.456 
ACIND 0.667 1.000 0.885 0.150 -0.581 1.423 
ACMEET 4.000 10.000 4.992 1.082 2.000 8.468 
ACEXPERT 0.200 1.000 0.475 0.202 0.910 3.013 
IAFINV (log) 8.923 15.607 11.408 1.350 0.808 3.433 
AF (log) 10.731 13.724 11.927 0.799 0.602 2.663 
NONAF (log) -9.210 12.763 6.009 8.051 -1.298 2.827 
OWCO 17.850 85.730 54.241 15.735 -0.161 2.318 
ROA -0.599 0.337 0.033 0.093 -0.892 6.647 
LEV 0.004 1.652 0.391 0.220 0.997 5.710 
FSIZE (log) 10.402 17.453 12.897 1.440 0.863 3.692 
SGROWTH -0.593 1.581 0.071 0.337 1.818 9.254 
 
The average number of meetings for the audit committee in the majority of companies is about 4.99which is more than 
what is recommended by the MCCG, i.e., to meet at least four times annually. The average investment on internal audit 
function is 11.41 (RM370,658) with the minimum value being8.92 (RM3,000) and the maximum value being15.61 
(RM39,000,000). These results indicate that there is a concerted effort towards investment in internal audit function to 
increase earnings quality and to enhance the quality of financial reporting in Malaysian Main Market listed companies.The 
average external audit fees is 11.93 (RM284,136) and the average non-audit services fees is 6.01 (RM97,310). An 
average of 54.24% of the firms’ shares is concentrated among the largest five shareholders in Malaysia Main Market 
companies which means that majority of the shares is in the hands of a few shareholders (high ownership concentration). 
In terms of the controlled variables, the size of companies varies with a minimum of 10.4 and a maximum of 17.45. 
The sample has an average leverage level of 39% and ROA of 3.3%. Some of the companies have losses. The average 
of sales growth is 7% and some have negative value which indicates revenue in current year is less than previous year.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Dichotomous Variables 
 
Observations Frequency Percentage Variable Name 1 0 1 0 
IAFSOUR 2032 937 1,095 46.10% 53.90% 
ACPART 2032 655 1,377 32.20% 67.80% 
BIG4 2032 1135 897 55.90% 44.10% 
LOSS 2032 438 1,594 21.60% 78.40% 
 
Table 5 indicates that 46.2% of Main Market listed companies in Malaysia have in-house internal audit function and 
53.8% of the companies outsource their internal audit function. The finding also indicates that 32.3% of Malaysian 
companies have audit committee chairman who was an audit partner. A total of 1,135 companies or 55.7% are audited by 
Big4 audit firms while another 44.3% (901 companies) are audited by non-Big 4 audit firms. The statistics also indicate 
that 21.5% of the companies have net income loss. 
Following previous studies (e.g., Saleh et al., 2007; Yoon et al., 2006; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Kraft, Lee & 
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Lopatta, 2014; Bonetti, Parbonetti & Magnan, 2013; Gaio, 2010; Kothari, Leone & Wasley, 2005; Prawitt et al., 2009), 
winsorized distributions were conducted to eliminate possible outliers in all continuous variables at the top and bottom 
one percent of the data distribution to maintain the characteristics of original data. Robust standard errors were 
conducted to estimate the regression models to solve heteroskedasticity problem. Skewness and kurtosis were used to 
test the normality assumption; for skewness, Hair, Tatham, Anderson and Black (2006) suggest a higher threshold of ±3; 
for kurtosis, Kline (1998) suggests a higher threshold of ±10. The results from this approach (see Table 4 and Table 5) 
led to the conclusion that the data set has no serious violation of the normality assumption. The correlation matrix 
between variables using Pearson correlation was conducted to test for multicollinearity issue. As presented in Table 6, no 
correlation exits of more than 0.80 (Hair et al., 2006); thus multicollinearity is not an issue in this study.  
 
Table 6. Correlations Matrix of Study Variables 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 DA1 1 
2 DA2 0.25*** 1
3 ACSZIE 0.0145 0.0147 1
4 ACIND -0.0348 0.0310 -0.1431 1
5 ACMEET 0.0037 0.0674 0.0981 0.0458 1
6 ACEXPERT -0.0014 -0.0226 -0.14* 0.0508 0.0129 1
7 ACPART 0.0289 0.0252 -0.0171 0.0054 0.0423 0.1244 1
8 IAFSOU -0.0711 -0.0440 0.17** 0.0716 0.0938 -0.0449 -0.0508 1
9 IAFINV -0.0948 -0.0887 0.27*** -0.0055 0.25*** -0.0572 -0.0406 0.64*** 1
10 BIG4 -0.1126 -0.0662 0.0948 -0.0390 0.0371 -0.0530 0.0406 0.17** 0.32*** 1
11 AF -0.0940 -0.0699 0.23*** 0.0412 0.24*** -0.0928 -0.0133 0.44*** 0.71*** 0.28*** 1 
12 NAF -0.0713 -0.0459 0.0775 -0.0059 0.0580 0.0235 0.0141 0.0596 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.19** 1 
13 OWCO 0.0163 0.0316 0.1097 -0.1123 0.0248 0.0075 -0.0142 0.0687 0.1222 0.15* -0.0010 0.0222 
14 ROA -0.18** -0.19** 0.1047 0.0016 -0.0681 0.0095 0.0083 0.0868 0.16** 0.18** 0.1005 0.1294 
15 LEV 0.1183 0.0114 0.0379 0.0230 0.1274 -0.0320 -0.0022 0.0362 0.1105 -0.1268 0.22*** -0.0779 
16 FSIZE -0.1254 -0.0485 0.25*** 0.0338 0.23*** -0.1234 -0.0099 0.44*** 0.76*** 0.35*** 0.79*** 0.22*** 
17 LOSS 0.15* 0.16** -0.0509 0.0412 0.0593 -0.0046 0.0072 -0.0936 -0.17** -0.16** -0.14* -0.0814 
18 SGROWTH 0.0398 -0.0825 0.0309 0.0449 0.0192 0.0105 -0.0235 0.0390 0.0320 0.0119 0.0606 0.0352 
13 14 15 16 17 18
13 OWCO 1 
14 ROA 0.15* 1
15 LEV -0.14* -0.32*** 1
16 FSIZE 0.1136 0.18** 0.18** 1
17 LOSS -0.1285 -0.66*** 0.27*** -0.22*** 1
18 SGROWTH -0.0009 0.19** 0.0375 0.0704 -0.17** 1
Note: *, **, ***, significant level at 10%, 5% and 1% , respectively. DA1 = Discretionary accruals modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al., 1995), DA2 = Extended of modified Jones model by (Yoon et al., 2006), ACSIZE = AC size, ACIND = AC independence, 
ACMEET = AC meeting, ACEXPERT = AC financial expertise, ACPART =AC chairman audit partner, IAFSOU = sourcing 
arrangements of internal audit function, IAFINV= investment in internal audit function, BIG4 = largest 4 audit firms, AF = external 
audit fees, NAF= external non-audit services fees, OWCO = Ownership Concentration, ROA = Return on assets, LEV = Leverage, 
FSIZE = Firm size, LOSS = Net Income Loss, SGROWTH = Sales Growth. 
 
 Results and Discussion 5.
 
The OLS regression was used to analyse the data. For the first dependent variable (DA1), the model is fit and significant 
at 1% level (with F-value = 6.22, R2 = 0.0792); and for the second dependent variable (DA2), the model is also fit and 
significant at 1%level (with F-value = 18.13, R2 = 0.2577).  
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Table 7. Multiple Regression Results 
 
|DA| = ȕ1 ACSIZE + ȕ2 ACIND + ȕ3 ACMEET + ȕ4 ACEXPERT + ȕ5 ACPART + ȕ6 IAFINVE + ȕ7 IAFSOUR + ȕ8 BIG4 + ȕ9 AF + ȕ10 
NONAF + ȕ11 FSIZE + ȕ12 ROA + ȕ13 LEV+ ȕ14 OWCO + ȕ15 LOSS + ȕ16SGROWTH + e 
Variables Predicted DA1 DA2 Sign Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
_cons ? 0.0838*** 3.94 0.362*** 2.82 
ACSIZE - 0.0046* 1.83 0.0186 1.22 
ACIND - -0.0063 -0.86 0.0449 1.04 
ACMEET - 0.0002 0.21 0.0238*** 3.64 
ACEXPERT - -0.0040 -0.73 -0.0374 -1.14 
ACPART - 0.00389* 1.66 0.0201 1.40 
IAFSOUR ? -0.0026 -0.90 0.0316* 1.73 
IAFINVE - 0.0010 0.64 -0.0294*** -2.88 
BIG4 - -0.0035 -1.44 -0.00758 -0.50 
AF - -0.0021 -0.92 -0.0267* -1.68 
NONAF - -0.0001 -0.73 -0.00136 -1.50 
OWCO + 0.0002*** 3.05 0.000123 0.28 
ROA - -0.0696*** -2.71 -0.664*** -3.87 
LEV + 0.0176*** 2.74 0.00675 0.17 
FSIZE - -0.0030** -2.02 0.0150 1.49 
LOSS + 0.0035 0.92 0.0451 1.64 
SGROWTH + 0.0108*** 2.76 -0.0401 -1.58 
Years Dummy ? Include Include 
Ind. Dummy ? Include Include 
F-value 6.22 18.13 
Sig 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.0792 0.2577 
N 2032 2032 
Note: *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. DA1 = Discretionary accruals under modified Jones model by 
Dechow et al., 1995, DA2 = Extended modified Jones model by Yoon et al., 2006;ACSIZE = AC size, ACIND = AC independence, 
ACMEET = AC meeting, ACEXPERT = AC financial expertise, ACPART = AC chairman former audit partner, IAFSOUR = sourcing 
arrangements of internal audit function, IAFINVE= investment in internal audit function, BIG4 = largest 4 audit firms, AF = external 
audit fees, NAF= external non-audit services fees, OWCO = Ownership Concentration, ROA = Return on assets, LEV = Leverage, 
FSIZE = Firm size, LOSS = Net Income Loss, SGROWTH = Sales Growth. 
 
Table 7 shows that ACSIZE is positively significant with DA1 (t = 1.83, p< 0.10) but not significant with DA2. This result 
does not support the agency theory and resource dependence theory which suggests that larger audit committees would 
effectively monitor and bring more external resources to enhance financial reporting quality.  
Audit committee meetings (ACMEET) is found to be significant with positive relationship with discretionary accruals 
(DA2) (t = 3.64, p< 0.01), but not significant with DA1.This result contradicts H3 which proposes an increase in ACMEET 
decreases the level of discretionary accruals. Also, this result is in contrast with the arguments of the agency and 
resource dependence theories that an increase in the frequency of audit committee meetings can enhance internal 
monitoring and increase the transparency of financial reporting by exploiting directors’ expertise during the meetings. The 
possible explanation might be due to the fact that high ownership concentration affects directors’ independence and leads 
to ineffective audit committee meetings. 
ACPART is found to be in a significantly positive relationship with DA1 but not with DA2.The significant relationship 
indicates that the discretionary accruals (DA1) is increasing in the companies which have audit committee chairman who 
is a senior or former audit partner. This finding contradicts the hypothesis. 
The results also show insignificant association between sourcing arrangements (IAFSOUR) and DA1, but a 
significant and positive association with DA2. The explanation of this result could be the in-house internal audit function 
(IAF) leads to increased discretionary accruals. This result suggests that outsourced IAF is more expertise compared to 
in-house IAF. In addition, outsourced IAF is considered as more independent and able to fulfil the monitoring role better 
than the in-house IAF (Johl, et al., 2013).  
The cost of internal audit function (IAFINVE) is insignificant with DA1 but significant and negatively related to DA2 
at the 1% level. This finding somehow indicates that increasing the cost of IAFINVE would increase internal monitoring by 
reducing the earnings management and lead to higher earnings quality. This result supports increasing investment in 
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internal audit function as a source to enhance internal monitoring. 
The association between external audit fees (AF) and DA1 is not significant but it is negatively significant with DA2 
(t = 1.68, p < 0.10). This supports the hypothesis that high audit fees can be a proxy of audit quality and subsequently, 
enhanced earnings quality. However, no significant relationship appears between external non-audit services fees 
(NONAF) with DA1 and DA2. In terms of ownership concentration (OWCO), the coefficient is significantly positive with 
DA1 (t = 3.05, p< 0.01), but insignificant with DA2.This result suggests the influence of OWCO on earnings quality which 
supports the agency theory.  
The insignificance of independent directors on the audit committee for both measurements (DA1 and DA2) implies 
that the independent directors on the audit committee are ineffective in overseeing the influence of the financial reporting 
process on earnings quality. Thus, H2is not supported. The finding could be justified by the nature of the job undertaken 
by the independent directors in terms of the committees they serve. In addition, the result indicates that audit committee 
expertise (ACEXPERT) is not related to earnings quality. The possible explanation might be due to lack of independence 
(Defond, Hann & Hu, 2005).The Big4 audit firm also has no significance with DA1 and DA2.  
For control variables, the ROA coefficient is significantly negative with both DA1 and DA2 at the 1% level. The 
current study finds that firm performance is positively related to earnings quality. This is consistent with Abdul Rahman 
and Ali (2006) who argue firms with low performance have the tendency to engage in earnings management. Meanwhile, 
Leverage (LEV) is found to have significantly positive relationship with DA1 at the 1% level, indicating that higher 
leveraged firms are more motivated to engage in earnings manipulation in order to avoid debt covenant violation. In other 
words, higher leverage leads to a higher level of earnings manipulation. Firm size (FSIZE) is negatively significant with 
DA1 at the 1% level, indicating that large firms report higher quality of earnings since they are closely monitored by the 
financial processes in the firms. Sales growth (SGROWTH) is in a positively significant relationship with DA1 at the 10% 
level, consistent with the finding in Warfield et al. (1995),indicating that increasing sales growth motivates the managers 
to engage in ‘smoothing’ earnings management. LOSS is found to be insignificant with discretionary accruals. 
 
 Conclusion 6.
 
The study finds some evidence that the extended M-Jones model of Yoon et al. (2006) is robust in detecting discretionary 
accruals in the Malaysian Main Market listed companies. The results provide evidence that outsourcing internal audit 
function, more investment in internal audit function and external audit fees increase the level of earnings quality. 
However, the results also indicate that some audit committee characteristics (such as size, independence, meeting 
frequency, financial expertise and chairman being former audit partner) may not contribute to enhancing earnings quality. 
The study also finds ownership concentration leads to low earnings quality. External audit by Big4 audit firms and non-
audit services fees are not associated with earnings quality. However, the scope of the study is limited to the Malaysian 
Main Market listed companies for a period of study of four years from 2009 to 2012. Therefore, it is suggested that future 
research should examine other variables, such as internal auditors’ characteristics and use different measurements to 
capture audit committee characteristics. 
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